



Bruxelles,
1 May 2024

Follow-up questions for written answer to the company “X” In regard to agenda item 2 of the 59th meeting on 13 March 2024

Questions from the parliamentary groups of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Block I: Suspensions, geopolitics, and the integrity of democratic processes

Suspensions:

- 1. What are the fundamental rules regarding suspensions? Ms. Navalnaya’s account was apparently automatically suspended in error. On what grounds was Ms. Navalnaya’s account suspended? On what grounds and on the basis of what specific criteria are accounts suspended automatically, are suspensions of this type reviewed, and how long does the process take?**

Ms. Navalnaya’s account was suspended due to a number of technical signals indicating it was not authentic. We face global efforts to manipulate our platform and in accordance with risk mitigation have a number of systems that may take automated action to defend the platform. We have already implemented a process improvement to ensure in similar circumstances an account is subject to a second review.

The fundamental rules relating to this suspension are available here:

<https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation>

- 2. Who can candidates or public figures like Ms. Navalnaya contact at X to seek support? Within what time frame does X guarantee support?**

Any user can contact us through our help center - help.x.com

- 3. How long does it take to unsuspend an account in cases like this, and who exactly reviews the reports? How long does it take X to review an erroneous suspension, and how quickly can a suspension be lifted – looking at the integrity of elections and electoral processes, for example?**

In this case we resolved the situation in less than one hour. Our safety team will review such escalations to resolve them swiftly.

- 4. In addition to the case of Ms. Navalnaya’s account, in which the suspension was quickly lifted again, there have been other cases of non-transparent account**

suspensions, for example affecting numerous journalists at the end of 2022, or, last Autumn, in the case of data analyst Travis Brown from Berlin. Can X explain why his account was suspended, given that he had not posted any illegal content, but rather had drawn attention to ways that potentially illegal content might be spread on X? What were the indications that led to the account being suspended?

We have a range of systems, using a combination of technology and humans, to proactively identify and address potential risks to the X service from bad actors. As AI has become more powerful, bad actors are able to utilize new techniques to try and evade our defenses - it is a highly adversarial and ever changing battle. While we do our best to minimise the number of false positives, no system is ever perfect, and unfortunately some accounts will be impacted incorrectly.

5. On what grounds did X lift the suspension on the account of the Identitarian Movement, which is under surveillance by the German intelligence services, and on the account of Austrian Martin Sellner, who is banned from entering Germany following the presentation of his “remigration plans”, both of which Twitter suspended in 2020?

All accounts must abide by the X rules. In limited circumstances, we have allowed accounts upon appeal to return to the service where their previous activity would no longer result in suspension. Where we receive legal process relating to specific accounts we review them in accordance with our country withheld content policy (reference [link](#)).

6. Under the previous system of verified accounts, the verification process ensured that these accounts would not be suspended. How does X ensure that the person claiming to be behind a verified account now is in fact the person responsible for the account? What is the value of verification, if the only criterion is that the user pays for it? Is this in fact “verification”?

Eligibility criteria to receive blue checkmarks (X Premium).

Our team uses an eligibility criteria on when the checkmark is given to ensure we maintain the integrity of the platform. Your account must meet the following criteria to receive or retain the blue checkmark:

- Complete: Your account must have a display name and profile photo
- Active use: Your account must be active in the past 30 days to subscribe to X Premium
- Security: Your account must have a confirmed phone number
- Non-Deceptive:
 - Your account must have no recent changes to your profile photo, display name, or username (@handle)
 - Your account must have no signs of being [misleading or deceptive](#)
 - Your account must have no signs of engaging in [platform manipulation and spam](#)

The checkmark will appear once our team reviews your Premium subscribed account and if it meets our requirements.

7. Even during the last European elections, there was already a considerable amount of discussion about disinformation and fake accounts, particularly on Twitter. With this in mind, Twitter established a policy team with numerous contact persons in Germany and Europe, and all candidates for the German Bundestag and for the European Parliament were able to undergo a secure verification process, also in collaboration with the Federal Office for Information Security and the Federal Returning Officer. How does X ensure the integrity of these accounts now?

X is in contact with German authorities and is already having several exchanges with them on how to best cooperate to protect the integrity of the EU24 elections. Our Global Government Affairs team is in contact with the BnetzA (DSC under the DSA) and with the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) to exchange on concerns, possible security issues and alerts in relation to elections. X is also supporting the dissemination of GADMO's media literacy campaign launched on 29 April through ad grants.

In order to avoid cases of impersonation or other potential harms to candidates, we asked the German electoral commission to share lists of candidates and possibly their handles to make sure we can provide support during the elections.

Our [Civic Integrity](#) policy and our [Synthetic and Manipulated Media](#) policy have been activated and will allow sweeps and proactive monitoring during the elections.

8. In view of the elections to the European Parliament and to the German Bundestag, and of the *Land* (federal state) parliamentary elections: Will there again be collaboration with the authorities in Germany and Europe, for example, the Federal Returning Officer or the Federal Office for Information Security?

Yes, we are already cooperating with several entities involved in the elections process both at EU and national level. German Federal Office for Information Security BSI, the Federal Network Agency (BnetzA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with the European Commission, European Parliament, EEAS and other DSCs and authorities in other EU Member States.

9. Will candidates be provided with training to help them protect themselves against fake accounts and false statements?

We have given a training on 25 April. The training was organized by the German Federal Office for Information Security BSI, and addressed to candidates and politicians in general on how to protect themselves on platforms during elections and how to make use of our conversation control systems. In November 2023, we gave a training to MEPs on how to use the platform and protect themselves on X during elections. We are having calls with all Digital Services Coordinators in Member States to inform them about our policies and actions to protect elections. We have made ourselves available for more training sessions for candidates in all Member States.

10. Are other measures planned to protect the integrity of the elections and the veracity

of accounts?

We will continue to evaluate potential partnerships with NGOs and experts to educate users of X about digital literacy, while we are also continuing to invest in stronger defenses against bad actors who may seek to abuse our service. We have also participated in the European Commission's table top exercise on elections that took place in Brussels on 24 April 2024.

11. The former Twitter "Civic integrity policy" from August 2023 is still on the X homepage and remains valid. Avoiding the creation of false accounts is given specific priority in this policy, as is preventing the spread of false information regarding electoral processes. How is this to be enforced if there is no serious option for the verification of potential candidates, for example? How does X plan to address false information on the electoral process, the spreading of which is prohibited? Will this be appropriately labelled in view, for example, of the elections to the European Parliament and to the German Bundestag, and of the *Land* (federal state) parliamentary elections? How does X intend to implement its own policy, which from the point of view of X itself is important for the protection of democratic processes?

We agree that it is important to ensure false accounts and impersonation accounts during an election should be removed and we will continue to do so, in partnership with stakeholders in the electoral process. We will enforce our civic integrity policy during the election period, and will be working with DSA nodes and law enforcement to identify illegal content that seeks to suppress voter participation.

12. Why has X lifted the ban on political adverts?

We have not lifted the ban on political advertisement in the EU.

13. It is understood that, following Elon Musk's takeover of the platform, the recommendations for the implementation of policy requirements that X has drawn up, often during long and complicated processes, have ceased to apply. How does X intend to ensure that the application of the rules remains neutral, and is not subject to the whims of a single person?

We never stopped enforcing the application of our policies and we will continue to do so.

Russian actors on X

14. Why did X make the decision to verify the accounts of Russian ministries and to highlight these accounts as verified so that the ministries in question could communicate internationally in English from the platform, although the platform itself is blocked in Russia? Are there specific grounds or criteria for this decision?

As has been the case for many years, our policy on Government accounts and verification does not differ between countries.

15. What measures is X taking to ensure that the content that is posted by official Russian ministries is in line with the platform's policies, particularly in regard to disinformation and propaganda? Does X plan to revise its policies in regard to permitting or blocking content and users from geopolitically disputed zones? How are decisions of this type made and regularly reviewed?

The X rules apply to all accounts and we will take action if any Government account violates them.

16. How does X view its role and responsibilities in geopolitical conflicts?

We appreciate that during times of conflict, the importance of preventing bad actors from manipulating the service is paramount.

For example, following the terror attack of October 7, 2023, we activated our crisis protocol and stood up the company to address the rapidly evolving situation with the highest level of urgency. That includes the formation of a cross-functional leadership team that has been working around the clock to ensure our global community has access to real-time information and to safeguard the platform for our users and partners.

17. Is X planning to work with governments or international organisations in order to develop policies or measures to regulate communication on the platform in geopolitically sensitive situations?

We would be open to these conversations, and continue to engage with a range of stakeholders to hear feedback on the service.

18. Can X provide examples of positive effects or of success stories resulting from the presence of official Russian ministries on the platform, particularly in regard to dialogue and understanding at international level?

Our focus is on enforcing the X rules.

Terms of Service

19. What policies and rules are currently in place at X, particularly given that, on the website at least, those that are available are mainly the Twitter rules which, in some cases still today, refer to Twitter rather than to X? Do those sections of the rules that refer to Twitter also apply to X?

While we continue to update the content of our resources to reflect the company's new name, the policies on our help centre remain relevant.

20. What is the legal entity for the company in the case of legal conflicts? It is stated repeatedly that "X will..." or "X does not permit..." How can this be valid if users have agreed to the Twitter terms of use and no longer know which of those rules remain applicable?

Twitter and X Terms of Service are the same as of September 29, 2023. Twitter renamed its Terms of Service to X Terms of Service, update published August 30, 2023 and effective

on September 29, 2023, as part of a public rebrand of the platform. On August 30, 2023, users were also provided an in-app prompt that notified them of this change. Nevertheless, except for the update to reflect the new name of the platform as X instead of Twitter, the terms of service remain the same. For users in the EU, the name of the legal entity for service of process is Twitter International Unlimited Company.

21. Is X systematically violating the rights of its users if reference is made to Twitter rules that are clearly not complied with?

No. See the response to Question 20 above. Regardless of whether the Terms of Services referred to are X Rules or Twitter Rules, the same rules apply.

Block II: Implementation of the DSA

1. Why has X decided not to establish an official presence or representation in Germany, a market with several million users? What were the strategic considerations behind this decision?

As part of the company's financial restructuring, which was essential to secure the continued viability of the company, we have consolidated our resources into fewer countries.

2. In May 2023, X withdrew from the voluntary EU Code of Practice on Disinformation. What were the reasons for this?

Twitter had raised a number of concerns with the Code during its drafting, highlighting areas where services took different approaches and had different resources available to them. We felt the Code needed more flexibility to ensure it adapts to the different companies' models to fight disinformation and does not become a process only the largest companies have the means to comply with, further entrenching dominant actors and stifling innovation.

Following discussions with the Disinformation Code team after the first reporting process, those concerns have not been sufficiently addressed and we feel we had no alternative unfortunately than to withdraw as signatories. We continue to have constructive discussions with the European Commission on the objectives of the code.

3. In the past, reports were dealt with and checked in line with the Network Enforcement Act (*Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG*) and with the Terms of Service. X worked with the responsible Federal Office of Justice in a lengthy process to create easily accessible, user-friendly reporting channels as part of the implementation of the requirements of the Network Enforcement Act. Today, posts can be reported in accordance with X's policies, or in accordance with EU requirements. However, the reporting channels are no longer easily accessible and are also no longer user-friendly. The process is no longer automated, for example, which means that all content (username, content, legal reason, location, etc.) must be entered manually. This is contradictory to the requirements of the DSA. When and how will X remedy this?

Our reporting channels remain easily accessible and all the DSA requirements on accessibility of reporting systems are met.

4. Does X ensure that all reported content is investigated on the basis of the applicable national criminal law provisions of the relevant member states? National criminal law provisions differ considerably in some cases, for example in regard to content regarding abortion, which is prohibited in Malta but permitted in Germany.

All reported content is investigated on the basis of applicable criminal law provisions of the relevant member state and, when EU wide regulations are at stake (e.g. in the case of the Terrorist Content Online Regulation), it is investigated on the basis of EU law.

5. How far advanced is the company with the risk analyses prescribed by the DSA?

We completed our DSA Risk Assessment report in 2023, and we are on track to complete an update for the forthcoming annual 2024 DSA Risk Assessment report, which will be released to the European Commission later this year.

Content moderation

6. When the figures from the first DSA transparency report are compared with the figures that the company Twitter reported under the German requirements stipulated in the Network Enforcement Act and that are constantly increasing, the difference is remarkable. How does X explain this discrepancy?

We have made no secret of the dire financial situation the company faced and the urgent need for restructuring. The continued operation of the service required it. We have continued to follow a risk-based approach in allocating resources to content moderation, alongside a renewed investment in technology.

7. How many content moderators has X let go since the takeover by Elon Musk? Have new content moderators been recruited to ensure compliance with the DSA?

As set out by the DSA, we have followed a risk-based approach in ensuring that our content moderation work is proportionate to the risks posed.

8. In the first DSA transparency report, X details 2,294 English-speaking and 81 German speaking content moderators. The figures are considerably lower for other European languages, e.g. Polish, with 1, Italian, with 2, and Dutch, with 1. The numbers are also very small for non-European languages, with 12 for Arabic and 2 for Hebrew. How does X intend to meet European requirements with such a small team?

Our risk assessment, following the DSA process, looks at a range of factors to inform our resource allocation.

9. How many Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking content moderators does X employ?

X is not active in Russia, but advanced automated tools are in place to ensure moderation of content in Russian and Ukrainian along with our global content moderation teams.

10. Can X explain the specific criteria and algorithms based on which posts on the platform are screened for disinformation and fake news and moderated accordingly? How does X ensure that this process is effective and non-partisan?

We do not have an algorithm to screen for 'fake news'.

11. How does X guarantee the transparency and comprehensibility of the algorithms that are used in the identification and moderation of disinformation and fake news? What options exist for users to appeal decisions made regarding the moderation of their content on X?

We do not have an algorithm performing moderation of 'fake news'.

12. Can X provide current figures and metrics on the extent of disinformation and fake news on the platform in Germany and Europe? How has the situation developed in recent years?

We do not measure 'fake news'.

13. What special challenges do the German and European markets pose for X in the fight against disinformation and fake news, and what strategies is X pursuing to meet these challenges?

The challenges of bad actors, manipulation and fake accounts are global ones, requiring a wide range of defences and mitigations. We are pursuing a range of approaches, from more aggressive interventions at account sign-up stage, including potentially payment requirements, to investment in our threat disruption team and expanding our team to increase engagement with German and other European authorities. It is essential that a far broader lens is taken to tackle this problem and if only the visible layer of content is tackled, while failing to disrupt the widespread use of telecommunications, cloud, AI and advertising systems, then we will fail to tackle the problem in the long term.

14. What is X's assessment of the influence of disinformation and fake news on public opinion and democratic processes in Germany and Europe? Does X feel that it has a responsibility to actively counteract this?

We believe we have a responsibility to protect the global town square on X from bad actors and manipulation, and the increasing sophistication of AI poses a direct challenge to tackling these problems. Meanwhile bad actors continue to broaden their efforts, both in terms of the services they use to enable their activity along with the range of services they target.

15. What role do community guidelines and user reports play in the identification of disinformation and fake news on X, and how effective are these tools in comparison with algorithm-based methods?

User reports are an important signal for us, but the majority of accounts suspended for platform manipulation and related violations are proactively detected by our automated tools, which are also designed to try and prevent these accounts from gaining access to X in the first place.

16. Does X plan to expand or change its strategies and tools for combating disinformation and fake news in Germany and Europe? What new approaches is X considering?

The challenges of bad actors, manipulation and fake accounts are global ones, requiring a wide range of defences and mitigations. We are pursuing a range of approaches, from more aggressive interventions at account sign-up stage, including potentially payment requirements, to investment in our threat disruption team and expanding our team to increase engagement with German and other European authorities

17. According to a study by the European Commission from September 2023, X is the platform with the highest ratio of posts with false information or disinformation. How does X explain this figure? What do the other platforms do differently?

X complies with all of its legal obligations with regards to mitigating risks from various types of content on the platform. X does not comment on the practices of other platforms.

18. An evaluation of the DSA Transparency Database

(<https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr/eu-datenbank-social-media-inhalte-100.html>zeigen) shows that, in comparison with Instagram and TikTok, X reports and deletes comparatively little content. What is the reporting process, and is X aiming to improve it?

X complies with the legal requirements around deletion of content.

19. What resources does X provide to raise user awareness of disinformation and fake news and to help users recognise these? Are there specific education or information campaigns for the German or the European market?

We are actively working on partnerships to support such campaigns ahead of the European elections. We are supporting the EDMO campaign and have boosted content on elections by the European Parliament. We are now discussing with DSCs and other key partners about additional campaigns we can support.

20. Is it correct that the owner of X, Elon Musk, has stated that he does not delete antisemitic or racist content because such content is not illegal and that he rejects the moderation of content because “Moderation is a propaganda word for censorship”? With this interpretation of the law, how does the owner intend to implement the European requirements stipulated in the DSA and the criminal law requirements of the EU member states? Does the owner of X share the opinion that, as owner of a public platform of such scope, he has a particular responsibility for protecting democratic discourse and the rule of law?

Our intent is to comply with the DSA, as the leadership of our company has expressed publicly and in direct engagement with the European Commission.

Academic Research access

- 21. X used to provide free access for the scientific and academic research community to APIs for reasons including researching the efficacy of the platform in public communication. The high price that X now charges for access to APIs means that German and European research institutions are effectively excluded from these interfaces. However, the DSA requires this transparency and access for research purposes; how does X intend to meet this requirement of the DSA?**

We have implemented a programme for researchers in compliance with the DSA.

- 22. Access for the research community was also an important backchannel for X as a company: researchers and users gave X important warnings of problems on the platform. What is the situation now?**

We continue to have relationships with a range of outside groups and experts.

- 23. The DSA requires data access for researchers, among other things. Applications have already been submitted to X in accordance with Article 40 (12) of the DSA, but we have received reports that some applications are approved while others are rejected, with little information on why the decision is made to reject these applications. How does X deal with these applications, and how many researchers and organisations have been given the status of “vetted researchers”? How many people process applications for data access within X? How does X justify rejections, and does X envisage any potential improvements in regard to the level of detail provided to back up rejections?**

We have implemented a programme for researchers in compliance with the DSA.

Miscellaneous

- 24. Twitter had a Trust and Safety Council, the purpose of which was to work together with independent citizen, human rights and other organisations to combat hate speech, the exploitation of children, suicide, self-harm and other problems on the platform. The Council’s tasks included advising the platform when new policies were to be introduced. In Germany, the Council worked, among others, with the organisation jugendschutz.net and the Antonio Amadeo Foundation, and on an international level it worked with NCMEC. Who decides on the introduction and implementation of new rules, and who advises the company in this regard?**

We speak to a range of groups, as well as reviewing publications, in considering our work.

- 25. Many critics felt that the platform Twitter was too powerful. Do you share the assessment that this power was further increased by a considerable degree by the**

takeover of the platform, and that today there is much greater potential for the platform to be abused by a single individual, for example due to arbitrary decisions regarding which accounts should be suspended or unsuspended?

No.

26. Why does X permit access to pornographic material with no age verification, although an age verification process is mandatory in Europe?

We have in place an age assurance process to ensure minors do not have access to age-sensitive content.

27. Why is there no collaboration in matters of the protection of children and young people with the German Association for Voluntary Self-Regulation of Digital Media Service Providers any more, although this was a given for Twitter?

We continue to collaborate with a range of external organisations and stakeholders and hope to expand that in future.

28. How are participants in the Community Notes process selected? How does the weighting of ratings take place?

Anyone on X whose account meets the eligibility criteria can sign up to help. All contributors start with the ability to rate notes, and over time, can earn the ability to write. Community Notes identifies notes that are found helpful by and for people with different points of view.

More information on the ranking process can be found here:

<https://communitynotes.x.com/guide/en/under-the-hood/ranking-notes>

Questions from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group

1. How high is the error rate for human content moderators in comparison to the error rate for automated/AI-based content moderators?

There is no single metric that we can provide here but we strive to ensure that all our processes are as accurate as possible and will take swift action to improve processes, training and technology to address potential areas of concern.

2. What measures are in place to train the data (algorithms, AI) so that incorrect judgements of this type can be rectified?

A range of measures are in place, including monitoring performance, a user-appeal process and on-platform feedback to identify potential issues and allow them to be rectified.

3. Does the company aim to establish an arbitration body for users to allow them to

defend themselves against (unjustified) suspensions?

We have no such plans in the short term.

4. How many X accounts have been suspended and then unsuspended again in the last 12 months? (Please provide a month-by-month breakdown of figures).

We provide data on our content moderation and appeals processes in our DSA Transparency report.

5. How many accounts that are politically active on X have been suspended in the last 12 months? (Please provide a month-by-month breakdown of figures).

We do not have this data available as we do not classify accounts based on their political activity.

6. How many X accounts that are associated with the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023 have been suspended in the last 12 months? (Please provide a month-by-month breakdown of figures).

Since the beginning of the conflict, X has suspended 5,454 Hamas affiliated accounts. More than one million accounts have been actioned for violations of our platform manipulation and spam policy. We have also taken action on more than 488,000 posts for violating our rules on hateful conduct and violent speech, while more than 46,000 posts have been labeled for synthetic and manipulated media.

7. How large must an X account be to receive a “second check” before it is suspended by X? What is the threshold for this?

This varies across policy areas and depends on a range of circumstances.

Questions from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) parliamentary group

1. A few days ago, the suspension of the X account of the long-term spokesperson of the Austrian “Identitarian Movement”, Martin Sellner, was lifted, which means that his Tweets, some from as long as six years ago, can be viewed again. What principles does X follow when deciding to unsuspend accounts? Were there special conditions in the case of Martin Sellner?

Any account suspended on X can appeal that decision and we will evaluate whether the activity they were suspended for remains a violation of the X rules.

2. How satisfied is the management of X with the development of advertising revenue on the platform? What is the difference in figures for advertising customers now, in comparison with the pre-Musk era?

We believe that X is a brand-safe environment and while many advertisers have returned to the platform, there are some who have not yet returned and we continue to encourage them to do so.

3. For a long time, Twitter was considered the network for professional communication, providing a platform for discussion among journalists, politicians, activists, PR professionals, public authorities, artists, businesses and cultural institutions. Elon Musk talked about turning X/Twitter into a universal service in the style of WeChat, combining a messaging service, a messenger app, a search engine, a bank account, a payment service and an appointment calendar. To what extent have these plans come to fruition?

X continues to be the top platform for curious and influential people worldwide, who use it daily to follow their passions, especially during important moments. By combining a public, live platform with the most engaged and influential users, we create a strong force for change. In 2023, we laid the groundwork for the global town square, and in 2024, that vision will come alive.

On the one-year anniversary of acquisition, [we shared our progress and the unstoppable momentum we've gained](#). X is not just another app – it's becoming the everything app, seamlessly uniting experiences into one interface, for everyone.

4. During the COVID-19 pandemic, were talks held between the Federal Government and the management of Twitter with the aim of avoiding critical discussion of the COVID-19 public health measures that were planned and implemented? If yes, how did the management of Twitter respond to this demand from the Federal Government?

We are unable to answer this as the individuals involved in those talks are no longer with the company.

5. Under Article 46 of the DSA, if there is “a serious threat to public security or public health”, platforms have an obligation to “prominently display information on the crisis situation provided by Member States’ authorities or at Union level”. How does X intend to implement this order to cooperate with the authorities? Does this not create the risk that X will become a submissive mouthpiece of the government, to the detriment of other opinions?

We will continue to act in a manner that defends free expression while complying with applicable laws, including where necessary challenging legal requests that we believe go beyond legal authority.

6. The account of Samidoun, a Hamas supporter association, was understandably suspended on X. How does X address Tweets that use the slogan “From the river to the sea”, show videos depicting the burning of the Israeli flag, or show the outline of

the State of Israel completely filled in with the colours of the Palestinian flag? Does X consider such Tweets to be acceptable expressions of opinions, or does it identify them as punishable antisemitism?

This would depend on the context they are used, for example whether to condemn such language or draw attention to it. Further information on our policy can be found here:

<https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy>

Questions from Member of the Bundestag Joana Cotar (Independent)

1. How can Members of the Bundestag contact X directly in order to have fake accounts (such as these ones: <https://twitter.com/Joanacotar>, <https://twitter.com/JoanaCotari>) removed, and what is X doing to limit the creation of such accounts?

X's policy on misleading and deceptive identities states that users may not pose as an existing person, group, or organization to mislead others about who you are or who they represent. Accounts that violate this policy will misrepresent their identity by using at least two elements of another identity, such as the name, image, or false claims of affiliation with another individual or organization in their profile or posts.

Accounts that violate this policy can be reported in-app, or here:

<https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-x-impersonation>

2. Is X considering the introduction of some other type of validation label for public figures to make it clear to users that the accounts in question are genuine?

Currently we have a 'grey' badge that is specifically for Government and elected office holders to provide this additional context. We continue to explore opportunities to broaden our product offering to provide more information to users, including through our subscription services.

3. What is X doing to counteract the flood of bot-created Russian propaganda that is strongly influencing public opinion against Ukraine and the Western world, and that in Germany often creates Tweets linking to websites that are designed to look like German news sites?

This is a good reminder of why it is essential that a wide range of services are involved in tackling bad actors - these websites are hosted, require services to manage them and will likely use many commercial tools. Relying on social media services to tackle the problem will not tackle the root issue. X will take action on accounts violating our rules, including impersonation and platform manipulation.

4. Is it in the interests of X for users to be able to choose to limit who sees their Tweets, but to then be able to write comments with their account that the thread creator cannot see? This would mean that potential fake news and insults would simply remain posted, with no monitoring.

We offer a range of tools to allow users to control their experience. This includes whether to have a public or private account, and also to control who can reply to their posts. Replies

can also be hidden by users. Our rules apply to all content posted, irrespective of which of these settings a user may use.

5. The DSA is very vague. In the recitals to be taken into account in the interpretation of the DSA, a clear distinction is made between spreading unlawful and “otherwise harmful information”, for example. What is X’s approach to this type of vague formulation? In case of doubt, would it tend to leave a statement, or delete it?

This is an important topic, and we will continue to balance our approach with due regard for protecting free expression and working with European authorities to highlight areas where we feel the law is insufficiently clear.

6. How does X ensure that it works with independent partners in the different countries and does not become a pawn of the different governments?

We continue to work with Governments and regulators around the world to understand their concerns and outline our work. We have made our views clear where such discussions may involve censorship that we will seek all avenues to challenge this, including through legal avenues and making public statements, while continuing to notify our users where their accounts are impacted by such requests. We believe that it is essential for all nations to challenge censorship and secrecy wherever it takes place, and to reject policies that may further undermine a free and open internet.